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Abstract. We consider the behaviour of a set of services in a stressed
web environment where performance patterns may be difficult to pre-
dict. In stressed environments the performances of some providers may
degrade while the performances of others, with elastic resources, may
improve. The allocation of web-based providers to users (brokering) is
modelled by a strategic non-cooperative angel-daemon game with risk
profiles. A risk profile specifies a bound on the number of unreliable ser-
vice providers within an environment without identifying the names of
these providers. Risk profiles offer a means of analysing the behaviour of
broker agents which allocate service providers to users. A Nash equilib-
rium is a fixed point of such a game in which no user can locally improve
their choice of provider – thus, a Nash equilibrium is a viable solution
to the provider/user allocation problem. Angel daemon games provide a
means of reasoning about stressed environments and offer the possibility
of designing brokers using risk profiles and Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
A web-based computation involves the discovery and utilisation of services. It is
often the case that a service is made available by a number of providers. The per-
formance of a provider can vary greatly over time (although service level agree-
ments (SLAs) may provide information about “normal” expected performance).
Brokers [2] are often used to monitor provider performance and to provide an
interface to the “best” current provider.
It is usually the case that the performance of a provider deteriorates as
demand increases (although “elastic” providers may call on extra servers in times
of peak demand – thus, in such (stressed) situations performance can conceivably
improve). The goal of this paper is to study the behaviour of a set of service
providers in a stressed environment with the hope that a clearer understanding
of stressed behaviour may aid the design of intelligent brokers.
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Here we adopt the point of view that providers should be treated in toto
since web users alternate between providers in times of high usage. We also
assume that users behave in a non-cooperative way (in that the behaviour of
others is, usually, irrelevant). Given these assumptions it is reasonable to model
the behaviour of a set of providers (resources) in a stressed environment as a
strategic situation in algorithmic game theory [8, 11, 12]. The notion of a Nash
equilibrium is used to derive an efficient broker allocation of providers to users
(see Example 1).
Example 1. Brokering in an idealised environment. Consider a situation
where a set of users {1, . . . , n} submit jobs for execution to a broker. Suppose that
the broker uses multiple predictable service providers (resources) R = {r1, . . . rk}
to meet demand. The broker allocates service providers to jobs in such a way as
to minimise user delay. This situation can be modelled by a non-cooperative game
with n players in which users “move” in sequence by allocating (or reallocating)
their job to a provider. Providers may have modified work loads and delays as
a consequence of a sequence of “moves”. A Nash equilibrium is an allocation
schedule in which no user can improve their situation by making a move1. uunionsq
The web is comprised of a very diverse range of resources. Such heterogeneity
contributes to the complexity of a web environment. Performance variability and
sporadic unavailability of underlying networks provide further complications.
Conventionally, unreliability is treated from a probabilistic viewpoint [9, 1, 10].
In contrast, we investigate a variety of provider behaviours within a stressed web
environment using non-cooperative game theory (see Example 2).
Example 2. Brokering in a stressed environment. Now consider a more
realistic refinement of the brokering example 1 where provider and network be-
haviour is less predictable. The following assumptions are made about stressed
web environments:
1. stress is non-uniformly distributed across the web;
2. patches of stress can move dynamically in response to users moving jobs
from stressed regions to more responsive providers;
3. the performance of certain providers may be highly vulnerable to heavy work
loads; other providers may incorporate autonomic behaviour which increases
the number of servers on offer in response to increased demand (elasticity).
Consequently, some providers may be associated with increased unreliability
at times of stress while others may exhibit robust behaviour.
An extended form of non-cooperative game is used to reason about brokering in
stressed environments; in addition to the n users the game additionally contains
two extra players: a daemon player who selects a number of sites to be stressed so
as to maximise the delay associated with the game (in a sense the daemon player
1 A set of users may individually find service providers without utilising a broker; this
process also corresponds to a game which may reach a Nash equilibrium. The broker
model acts as an abstraction of this alternative allocation problem.
models the deterioration of a stressed network at a set of vulnerable points); and
an angel who selects a number of sites so as to minimise delay (in some sense
the angel models the capacity of a network to modify its behaviour so as to
improve throughput). Unreliability is described by the notion of a risk profile
which specifies (a priori) possible angel and daemon behaviours; given a risk
profile the behaviour of a broker in a stressed environment can be described by
an associated n+ 2 player game. uunionsq
Risk profiles were introduced in [3–5] to analyse network behaviour when a
bounded number of services failed. However, risk profiles are sufficiently rich to
allow the analysis of stressed web environments where networks may be under the
influence of competing tendencies (one destructive, the other self-correcting). In a
risk profile bounds are placed on both the constructive and destructive capacities
(for example, an unreliable network may have no self-correcting behaviour and
no angel player). As far we know the use of risk profiles to model stressed web
environments is new.
The paper is structured as follows. Basic models of resource allocation games
are given in § 2, with particular attention placed on uniform unit allocation
games. In § 3 risk profiles are defined and Weltanschauungs are used to model
stress in allocation problems. In § 4 angel-daemon games are defined and used
to analyse stressed resource allocation problems. Snapshots are used in § 5 to
provide a condensed description of strategy profiles; these are used to study pure
Nash equilibria. In § 6 we consider the structure of pure Nash equilibria in angel-
daemon games. In § 7 the idea of a risk-aware broker is developed. Finally in § 8
some open questions are raised.
2 Resource allocation games
We consider a basic resource allocation game introduced by Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou in [11, 8] as a means of modelling simple competitive situations.
A resource allocation game (also called load balancing game) is a tuple
C = 〈N,R, (wi)i∈N , (dr)r∈R, (Ai)i∈N , 〉
where the set of players is N = {1, . . . , n}. Player i ∈ N has to execute a
job (or work) wi. The set of resources is R = {1, . . . , k}. Each resource r ∈ R
has a delay function dr. For each player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai is the set of possible
allocations for work wi, with Ai ⊆ R. A strategy si (or action) for a player i
is an element of Ai, (player i chooses a resource). A strategy profile is a tuple
s = (s1, . . . , sn). Given a player i and a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) we
denote by s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) the profile where the strategy si is
missing. Given a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ A1 × · · · × An, the set of
players using resource r ∈ R is Lr(s) = {i ∈ N | r = si} and the load of
resource r is the weight of the players using r, that is `r(s) =
∑
i∈Lr(s) wi. The
cost for player i of strategy profile s, is defined as ci(s) = dsi(`si(s)). Following
J. Bentham, 1748-1832, the social cost of a strategy profile s is defined additively
as cs(s) =
∑
i∈N ci(s). In some examples, in order to simplify matters, costs are
defined as ci(s) = ddsi(`si(s))e and cs(s) =
∑
i∈Nddsi(`si(s))e.
Given a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) we define the load map of strategy s
as the vector `(s) = (`1(s), . . . , `k(s)) which describes macroscopically the load
of each resource under strategy profile s. Observe that in load maps part of the
information contained in a strategy profile is lost: we do not know which player
is using a given resource.
Resource allocation games are a particular case of strategic games [6]. Strate-
gic games can be used to model non-cooperative behaviour: a solution to a game
corresponds to identifying Nash equilibria [6]. A pure Nash equilibrium (PNE
for short) is a strategy profile s∗ such that for any player i ∈ N and for any
strategy si ∈ Ai, ci(s∗) ≤ ci(s∗−i, si), where (s∗−i, si) denotes the strategy profile
in which s∗i is replaced by si.
We are interested in analysing some specific natural types of delay functions,
non-negative and monotone, and in particular affine functions, that is dr(x) =
dr x with 0 < dr <∞.
Example 3. Consider an allocation game Fortran&MPI Servers defined in Fig-
ure 1. The web environment comprises four servers R = {1, 2, 3, 4} with delays
d1 = 1/2, d2 = 1/4, d3 = 1/4 and d4 = 1/8. Cost functions and social cost are
defined using ceiling functions. Resources 1, 2, 3 can execute Fortran programs.
Resources 1, 3, 4 can execute MPI programs. There are 5 jobs to be executed
(superindices are used to denote the type of a job).
wMPI1 = 10, w
F
2 = 5, w
F
3 = 6, w
MPI
4 = 15, w
F
5 = 3
Thus job 1 can be executed using resources (servers) 1, 2 and 3 etc. and so
A1 = A4 = {1, 3, 4} and A2 = A3 = A5 = {1, 2, 3}. Consider a strategy profile
s = (1, 1, 1, 4, 3), where s5 = 3 denotes that “job w
F
5 is mapped to resource 3”.
The load map of this profile is `(s) = (21, 0, 3, 15). In s the cost of player 1 is
high because c1(s) = d 12 (wMPI1 + wF2 + wF3)e = 11, therefore player 1 has a strong
incentive to move his job to another server with lower current cost. Suppose that
player 1 moves to server 3 (denoted by 1
wMPI1→ 3): the cost to player 1 improves
from 11 to 4 and therefore s is not a PNE. By performing a sequence of similar
kinds of move we finally get a PNE (3, 2, 3, 4, 1) with social cost 13. This PNE
is non-unique: for instance (4, 2, 3, 4, 2) is a PNE having a social cost 14. uunionsq
In some cases (uniform) all the resources have the same capability. This
forces Ai = R for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and moreover all the resources have the same
delay function. We are specially interested in uniform affine delays dr(x) = dx,
0 < d < ∞. We distinguish the case where all players have the same unit
weight works (or jobs), i.e. wi = 1 for all i ∈ N . Inspired by [11], let Unitn,k,d
be the unit resource allocation game with n players, k resources and uniform
affine delays with coefficient d. For unit weight games load maps provide enough
information to describe a family of “equivalent” strategy profiles. The following
lemma captures a widely-observed result.
Lemma 1. In the Unitn,k,d game, a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a PNE,
iff `(s) has n%k resources with load dn/ke and the remaining resources have load
bn/kc and the social cost is (dn/ke n+ bn/kc n%k) d.
Fortran&MPI Servers
Resources
1 2 3 4
Services
F, MPI F F, MPI MPI
Delay
1/2 1/4 1/4 1/8
Initial strategy
s
wMPI1 = 10 w
F
5 = 3 w
MPI
4 = 15
wF2 = 5
wF3 = 6
Cost 11 1 2
Moves
1
wMPI1→ 3
wF2 = 5 w
MPI
1 = 10 w
MPI
4 = 15
wF3 = 6 w
F
5 = 3
Cost 6 4 2
1
wF3→ 3
wF2 = 5 w
MPI
1 = 10 w
MPI
4 = 15
wF3 = 6
wF5 = 3
Cost 3 5 2
3
wF5→ 1
wF2 = 5 w
MPI
1 = 10 w
MPI
4 = 15
wF5 = 3 w
F
3 = 6
Cost 4 4 2
1
wF2→ 2
wF5 = 3 w
F
2 = 5 w
MPI
1 = 10 w
MPI
4 = 15
wF3 = 6
Cost 2 2 4 2
3
wF3→ 2
wF5 = 3 w
F
2 = 5 w
MPI
1 = 10 w
MPI
4 = 15
wF3 = 6
Cost 2 3 3 2
Fig. 1. Allocation game Fortran&MPI Servers. Servers 1 and 3 offer Fortran and MPI
services. Server 2 offers Fortran services and server 4 offers MPI services. An initial
allocation s = (1, 1, 1, 4, 3) is displayed. A sequence of moves which end with the PNE
(3, 2, 2, 4, 1) is also displayed.
Proof. Consider a game Unitn,k,d with n unit jobs (or works) wi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and r servers (or resources). The broker allocates bn/kc jobs into each server.
After that there remain n%k jobs to allocate. As n%k < n, the broker spreads
these into the different servers (one per server). After such allocation, there are
n%k servers with load dn/ke and r−n%k server with load bn/kc. We can easily
prove that such allocation is a PNE. Moreover any other “type” of allocation is
not a PNE. In such cases there exists an oveloaded server and any job in such a
server has interest to migrate.
Let us consider the social cost. The n%k servers contribute a social cost of
(n%d)dn/ke2d. The remaining k−n%k servers contribute a cost (n−n%k)bn/kc2d.
The social cost is dkbn/kc2 + d(n%k)(dn/ke2 − bn/kc2) A little thought allows
us to see (n%k)(dn/ke2 − bn/kc2) = (n%k)(2bn/kc + 1) and the social cost is
rewritten as dkbn/kc2 + d(n%k)(2bn/kc+ 1). As kbn/kc+ n%k = n we rewrite
as dbn/kc(n%k) + dn%k. As n%k(bn/kc+ 1) = n%kdn/ke we get the final ex-
pression. uunionsq
3 Risk profiles and Weltanschauung
Risk profiles [5] are used to describe stressed environments in which two compet-
ing forces act on resources. Assume that the set of resources R in an allocation
game is partitioned into two subsetsA and D such that R = A∪D andA∩D = ∅.
Subset A is controlled by an agent a called the angel ; A is used to model
resources which behave robustly under stress. When a resource r is selected by
the angel it runs under the angelic delay function dAr . The angel can force angelic
behaviour only for a limited number of resources fA. The angel’s objective is to
improve system behaviour as much as possible.
Subset D is controlled by another agent d called the daemon that exhibits
malicious behaviour. When r is selected by the daemon it runs under the dae-
monic delay function dDr . Again the daemon can affect only a limited number of
resources, fD. The daemon’s objective is to maximise system delay.
We summarize all these ideas into the following definition of risk profile:
Definition 1. Given C = 〈N,R, (wi)i∈N , (dr)r∈R, (Ai)i∈N 〉, a risk profile for
C is a tuple R = 〈C,A,D, fA, fD, (dAr )r∈A, (dDr )r∈D〉.
Risk profiles can model highly non-uniform network behaviour with extreme and
diverse stress levels. For instance, consider two resources r and r′, with delays
dr and dr′ , controlled by the angel. The way that the angel influences r and r
′
may be very different: it may be the case that dAr = b
√
drc while dAr′ = bln dr′c.
Some concrete instances of abnormal (angel and daemon) uniform delay func-
tions are considered and the resulting situations (world views) are analysed us-
ing the notion of Weltanschauung. A Weltanschauung defines one uniform type
of stress for the angel and another uniform stress for the daemon. The set of
Weltanschauungs W that are used in the paper are formalised below:
In the first classification the angel and daemon have two possible sensitivi-
ties 2 with respect to the environment: an extreme sensitivity (denoted by E)
2 In this paper the words sensitivity and moral are used in a mathematical context
which, nevertheless, mimics the usual meaning of these words. In [7] sensitive is
defined as quick to detect, respond to, or be affected by slight changes, signals, or
influences. An alternative meaning (especially well-adapted to the daemon) is easily
offended or upset. It is assumed that angel and daemon act instantaneously on the
environment.
or a moderate one (denoted by M). The set W combines these sensitivity types.
The set of joint sensitivities is S = {E-E,E-M,M-E,M-M}. At a second level,
both the angel and the daemon have a joint psychological view of the environ-
ment called here the moral3. A moral is associated with both, the angel and the
daemon conjointly; the set of morals formed by the basic types is:
M = {Crash,Benevolent,Polarized,Schizophrenic}
Formally the set of Weltanschauungs is W = S × M and a Weltanschauung is
written as w ∈ W. Depending on the sensitivity and moral, the angel and the
daemon stress the delay functions of a resource in the following way:
Crash Benevolent Polarized Schizophrenic
E-E dAr =∞ dAr = 0 dAr = 0 dAr =∞
dDr =∞ dDr = 0 dDr =∞ dDr = 0
E-M dAr =∞ dAr = 0 dAr = 0 dAr =∞
dDr = βdr d
D
r = βdr d
D
r = βdr d
D
r = βdr
M-E dAr = αdr dAr = αdr dAr = αdr dAr = αdr
dDr =∞ dDr = 0 dDr =∞ dDr = 0
M-M dAr = αdr dAr = αdr dAr = αdr dAr = αdr
dDr = βdr d
D
r = βdr d
D
r = βdr d
D
r = βdr
1 < α <∞ 0 < α < 1 0 < α < 1 1 < α <∞
1 < β <∞ 0 < β < 1 1 < β <∞ 0 < β < 1
A Weltanschauung w for the case E-E is the list of pairs: (∞,∞), (0, 0), (0,∞)
and (∞, 0). When the angel and daemon have a moderate behaviour (case M-M)
we assume that dAr = αdr d
D
r = βdr. The values that α and β take depend on
the morals. As we can associate a risk profile to a given w ∈W and as we know
how to stress dr into d
A
r or d
D
r , then we can extend the definition of risk profile
to incorporate Weltanschauung:
Definition 2. Let C = 〈N,R, (wi)i∈N , (dr)r∈R, (Ai)i∈N 〉 be a resource allo-
cation game and let w ∈ W be a Weltanschauung. A risk profile is a tuple
R = 〈C,A,D, fA, fD,w〉 where A ∩D = ∅ and A ∪D = R.
Example 4. Consider a risk profile for the game Fortran&MPI Servers (see Ex-
ample 3). Suppose that the angel a controls servers 1 and 2 (i.e. A = {1, 2}) and
the daemon d controls servers 3 and 4 (i.e. D = {3, 4}). Assume that both the
angel and the daemon have limited capacity to act over the game: for instance
fA = fD = 1. Consider the following scenario (where cost functions are again
rounded by the ceiling function):
– The angel a controls a number of servers: assume that one of these servers
fails when put under stress i.e. dAr =∞.
3 In [7] moral is defined as conforming to accepted standards of behaviour. In this paper
the moral determines the joint social behaviour of the angel and the daemon.
– The daemon d controls a number of robust servers. However, one server’s
performance is degraded under stress and so dDr = βdr where β = 3/2 (note
that β > 1).
This situation is a Crash Weltanschauung w = (∞, 3/2) of type E-M and can be
used to describe the risk profile
Stop&Slow = 〈Fortran&MPI Servers, {1, 2}, {3, 4}, 1, 1, (∞, 3/2)〉. uunionsq
Example 5. A dual scenario arises when the roles of a and d are interchanged:
A = {3, 4}, D = {1, 2} and fA = fD = 1. Now the angel a increases its delay
by a factor 3/2. The daemon d can close a service (d is delighted with such a
possibility). This situation is a Crash Weltanschauung (3/2,∞) with risk profile
Slow&Stop = 〈Fortran&MPI Servers, {3, 4}, {1, 2}, 1, 1, (3/2,∞)〉. 2
Both scenarios are analysed using game theory below.
4 Angel-daemon games
A risk profile R reflects a strategic situation that can be analysed by an angel-
daemon game4. In such a game, the stress actions are taken by two active players
the angel a and the daemon d. The subset of resources A in R is controlled by
an agent a called the angel. The angel tries to improve the behaviour as much as
possible. To do that, a selects a subset a of fA resources in A. When a resource
r is selected (formally r ∈ a) it runs under the angelic delay function dAr (x).
The angelic cost ca is defined as the (entire) social network cost calculated using
updated (stressed) delays. Thus, ca(σ) ≥ 0. Dually, D in R is controlled by
another agent d called the daemon D. The daemon tries to make the situation
deteriorate as much as possible by choosing fD resources in D. When r is selected
by d, it has a delay dDr (x). The cost to the daemon is defined as cd = −ca. Note
that the definition of the angel and daemon cost functions give rise to opposite
behaviours of a and d: the goal of a is to minimise the overall social cost whereas
d has the opposite strategy. Below is the formal definition of an angel-daemon
game with an associated risk profile:
Definition 3. Given C = 〈N,R, (wi)i∈N , (dr)r∈R, (Ai)i∈N 〉 and a risk profile
R = 〈C,A,D, fA, fD,w〉, the angel-daemon game associated to R is Γ (R) =
〈N ∪ {a, d}, (Ai)i∈N , Aa, Ad, (ci)i∈N , ca, cd〉 where Aa = {a ⊆ A | |a| = fA} and
Ad = {b ⊆ D | |b| = fD}. Given (a, d) ∈ Aa ×Ad the cost function of a resource
r is defined as follows.
dr[a, d] =

dAr if r ∈ a.
dDr if r ∈ d.
dr if r /∈ (a ∪ d).
4 We define a game using the notation given in [6]. A game is a tuple Γ =
〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ci)i∈N 〉 such that N is the set of players, Ai is the set of actions for
player i and ci is the cost of player i.
Given a strategy profile σ = (s, a, d), player i ∈ N incurs a cost ci(σ) =
dsi [a, d](`si(s)), the angel cost is ca(σ) =
∑
i∈N ci(σ) and the daemon cost is
cd(σ) = −ca(σ).
Example 6. Consider a one player game SimpleCloud in which a cloud user
wishes to execute a job w with weight 16. Two cloud services can execute w
(i.e. R = {1, 2} and A1 = {1, 2}). The services have delays 1/2 and 1/8, respec-
tively (i.e. d1 = 1/2 and d2 = 1/8). The two possible strategies for job placement
are s1 = 1 or s1 = 2. Suppose that SimpleCloud is stressed using a moderate
sensitivity (type M-M) Crash Weltanschauung w = (2, 2) with two associated
risk profiles, Angel and Daemon.
In the Angel profile the angel controls both resources, A = R, but can act
over only one, fA = 1. Since D = ∅ (and fD = 0) the only strategy for d is
d = ∅. As d cannot “move” the game Γ (Angel) has only two “active players”,
the user and the angel a. If the angel chooses the first service (a = {1}) then
the delays are d1[{1}, ∅] = 2 ∗ 1/2 and d2[{1}, ∅] = 1/8; otherwise a = {2} and
d1[{2}, ∅] = 1/2 and d2[{2}, ∅] = 1/4. Game Γ (Angel) is
user
a
{1} {2}
1 16, 16 8, 8
2 2, 2 4, 4
Γ (Angel)
user
d
{1} {2}
1 16,−16 8,−8
2 2,−2 4,−4
Γ (Daemon)
The strategy (2, {1}, ∅) is the only PNE in Γ (Angel). In this equilibrium, a
increases the delay of the slower service while the job is placed on the faster one.
Given Daemon = 〈Small , ∅, {1, 2}, 0, 1,w〉, the associated game Γ (Daemon),
has again only two effective players (the user and d); Γ (Daemon) has only one
PNE: (2, ∅, {2}). In this case d increases the delay of the faster service and job
w is also allocated to service 2. uunionsq
Example 7. Consider SimpleCloud again (see Example 6). Suppose that a mod-
erate beneficial stress is applied to the game, w = (1/2, 1/2). With risk profile
Angel ′ = 〈SimpleCloud , {1, 2}, ∅, 1, 0,w〉, game Γ (Angel ′) has a PNE (2, {2}, ∅).
With Daemon ′ = 〈SimpleCloud , ∅, {1, 2}, 0, 1,w〉 game Γ (Daemon ′) has a unique
PNE, (2, ∅, {1}). uunionsq
Example 8. Consider game Γ (Stop&Slow) (from Example 4). Consider a risk
profile for Fortran&MPI Servers (Example 3) where the set of players is N ∪
{a, d}, fA = fD = 1 Aa = {{1}, {2}} and Ad = {{3}, {4}}. Suppose that jobs are
allocated using the schedule s = (3, 2, 3, 4, 1). The angel a closes site 1 (a = {1})
while the daemon d chooses to deteriorate the performance of site 3 (d = {3}).
The stressed delay functions dr[a, d] are:
d1[{1}, {3}] =∞, d2[{1}, {3}] = d2 = 1/4,
d3[{1}, {3}] = βd3 = 3/4× 1/4, d4[{1}, {3}] = d4 = 1/8
The preceding profile is not a PNE because wF5 can improve its situation by
moving from server 1. However, σ = ((3, 2, 2, 4, 2), {1}, {3}) is a PNE. We have
c1(σ) = 4, c2(σ) = c3(σ) = c5(σ) = 4, c4(σ) = 2 with an associated social cost
cs(σ) = 18: in this case ca = 18 and cd = −18. In order to prove that σ is a
PNE we need to show that no player in N ∪ {a, d} is interested in changing its
strategy.
– It is easy to see that no job i ∈ N can improve their (private) cost ci by
moving to another server.
– If a changes from {1} to {2}, the new profile is τ = ((3, 2, 2, 4, 2), {2}, {3})
and the new cost is c2(τ) = c3(τ) = c5(τ) =∞. Clearly, the angel a will not
make such a move.
– If d changes from {3} to {4}, the profile is τ ′ = ((3, 2, 2, 4, 2), {1}, {4}) and
the new daemon delay functions are d3[{1}, {4}] = 1/4 and d4[{1}, {4}] =
3/2× 1/8. The costs are c1(τ ′) = 3, c2(τ ′) = c3(τ ′) = c5(τ ′) = 4, c4(τ ′) = 3.
and the social cost cs(τ
′) = 18. As social cost of τ ′ is the same as the social
cost of σ, the agent d does not conduct this move. uunionsq
Example 9. Consider the game Γ (Slow&Stop) (Example 5) again. As before
A = {3, 4}, D = {1, 2} and fA = fD = 1. Γ (Slow&Stop) has no PNE. Proof by
case analysis.
– Consider profile σ = (s, a, {1}) where d1[a, {1}] =∞. Suppose that there is
an i ∈ N such that si = 1 (at least one work is placed on server 1). Profile
σ cannot be a PNE because work i can be placed elsewhere to reduce the
social cost.
– Consider profile σ = (s, a, {1}) where no jobs are allocated to server 1 but
there is at least one job allocated to server 2. The daemon d would select
server {2} (rather than 1) to increase the social cost (to infinity). Thus, we
can assume that in a PNE no jobs are placed on servers 1 or 2.
– Consider a profile σ = (s, a, {1}) with no jobs allocated to servers 1 and 2.
Now server 2 works and is free and so the existing Fortran job prefers to
move to server 2 and so we get a contradiction.
Case (s, a, {2}) is similar. uunionsq
5 Snapshots and anonymous pure Nash equilibria
Now we extend the notion of load of a resource `r(s) to obtain information about
the situation of r in relation to a and d. We also add the delay function being
currently used in this resource to obtain an adequate snapshot of the system oc-
cupancy. When we need to make explicit the Weltanschauung we replace dr[a, d]
with dr[a, d,w].
Definition 4. Let Γ (R) be an angel-daemon resource allocation game, R =
〈C,A,D, fA, fD,w〉, with profile σ = (s, a, d). For a resource r ∈ R define two
properties:
affiliation =
{
a if r ∈ A
d otherwise
selected =
{
y if r ∈ a ∪ d
n otherwise
Property affiliation indicates whether r is controlled by the angel or the daemon.
Property selected denotes whether r’s behaviour is abnormal or not (i.e. whether
r has been chosen by either angel or daemon). A snapshot is a tuple δ(σ,w) =
(δ1(σ,w) | · · · | δk(σ,w)) which provides information about the current state of
each of the resources where δr(σ,w) = (affiliationselected, `r(s), dr[a, d,w])
Snapshots provide a clear picture of (i) the occupancy of resources, (ii) the
strategies of a and d, and (iii) the delay functions applicable to each resource.
When the context is known we abbreviate the notation of a snapshot to δ(w).
Example 10. Consider Unit2,4,d under a risk profile A = {1, 2}, D = {3, 4} and
fA = fD = 1. Given σ = (s, a, d) = ((2, 4), {1}, {4}) and w = (∞,∞), the
snapshot is δ(σ, (∞,∞)) = (ay, 0,∞ | an, 1, d x | dn, 0, d x | dy, 1,∞) uunionsq
Lemma 2. Let R = 〈Unitn,k,d,A,D, fA, fD,w〉, be a risk profile associated with
a unit resource allocation game and Weltanschauung w and let σ = (s, a, d),
σ′ = (s′, a′, d′) be two strategy profiles of the angel-daemon game Γ (R). Then
δ(σ,w) = δ(σ′,w) iff a = a′ and d = d′ and there is a permutation pi of {1, . . . , n}
such that pi(Lr(s)) = Lr(s
′) for any 1 ≤ r ≤ k.
Proof. Define R = {1, . . . , k} and N = {1, . . . , n}. Observe that δ(σ,w) =
δ(σ′,w) implies that a = a′ and d = d′ and that for any r ∈ R.`r(σ) = `r(σ′).
Therefore, for any r ∈ R the number of players in N that select r is the same
for s and s′. Thus there is a bijection between Lr(s) and Lr(s′). The per-
mutation pi is obtained by composing the bijection defined for each resource.
Given R = 〈C,A,D, fA, fD,w〉, and strategies σ = (s, a, d), σ′ = (s′, a′, d′) with
a = a′ and d = d′ such that there exists a permutation pi : N → N satisfying
pi(Lr(s)) = Lr(s
′) for r ∈ R, then δ(σ,w) = δ(σ′,w).
Let pi be a permutation fulfilling the conditions given in the lemma. As we
have pi(Lr(s)) = {pi(i) | si = {r}} = {j | s′j = {r}}, for every i there exists j
such that pi(i) = j and si = s
′
j = {r}. Take i and r such that si = spi(i) = {r},
then
ci(σ) = dr[a, d,w](`r(s)) = dr[a
′, d′,w](`r(s′)) = cpi(i)(σ′)
As pi is a permutation ca(σ) =
∑
i∈N ci(σ) =
∑
i∈N cpi(i)(σ
′) = ca(σ′) and
similarly for d. The conditions on cost follow. Finally, given R, s and s′ such
that a = a′ and d = d′, for any r the parts affiliationselected and dr[a, d,w] coincide
in δr(σ,w) and in δr(σ
′,w). Finally, as pi(Lr(s)) = Lr(s′), we have `(s) = `(s′)
and both strategies have the same snapshot. uunionsq
Lemma 3. Given Γ (R) for R = 〈Unitn,k,d,A,D, fA, fD,w〉, and σ = (s, a, d),
σ′ = (s′, a, d) such that δ(σ,w) = δ(σ′,w) then σ is a PNE iff σ′ is a PNE.
Proof. There exists pi such that the role of player i in s is mapped into the
role of player pi(i) = j in s′. We can imagine j as an alias of i. Imagine that
i is interested in changing from r to rˆ, that is change si = {r} into sˆi = {rˆ},
because ci(σ−i, sˆi) < ci(σ). Note that `rˆ(σ) = `rˆ(σ′) and `rˆ(σ−i, sˆi) = `rˆ(σ) + 1.
As si = s
′
pi(i) = {r}, defining sˆpi(i) = {rˆ} we have the loads `rˆ(σ′−pi(i), sˆpi(i)) =
`rˆ(σ
′) + 1 = `rˆ(σ−i, sˆi) and
cpi(i)(σ
′
−pi(i), sˆpi(i)) = drˆ[a, b](`(σ
′
−pi(i), sˆpi(i))) = ci(σ−i, sˆi)
and player pi(i) has an interest in changing the strategy. Suppose that a is inter-
ested in changing in σ = (s, a, d) from a to aˆ because ca(s−a, aˆ) < ca(s). Note
that `r(s) = `r(s−a, aˆ) for any r ∈ R, therefore
ca(s−a, aˆ) =
∑
r∈R
`r(s)dr[aˆ, d](`r(s)) = ca(s
′
−a, aˆ)
and a has an interest in changing also in s′. The daemon has similar behaviour.
uunionsq
In snapshots resource loads are important but the player of the load is not. Thus,
by lemmas 2 and 3, snapshots describe Nash equilibria in an “anonymous way”.
This idea is at the root of the following definition.
Definition 5. A snapshot δ is called an anonymous Nash equilibrium iff there
exists a PNE σ such that δ(σ) = δ.
The following lemma demonstrates that, even in simple cases, the existence of a
set of resources under the control of a daemon prohibits the existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 4. For any w ∈W, the game Γ (Rw) corresponding to the profile Rw =
〈Unit1,2,d, ∅, {1, 2}, 0, 1,w〉 has no pure Nash equilibria.
Proof. The game Unit1,2,d without an angel or daemon has two Nash equilib-
ria, namely, s1 = {1} or s1 = {2}. The introduction of a daemon changes the
situation completely. Now there are no anonymous Nash equilibria.
Define R = {1, 2}. As in Rw we have A = ∅, D = R, fA = 0 and fD = 1,
by symmetry we have to consider only the snapshots (dy, 1, d
D(x) | dn, 0, d(x)),
(dy, 0, d
D(x) | dn, 1, d(x)). As usual d(x) = dx. The possible values for a demonic
delay function are dD(x) = ∞, dD(x) = 0, dD(x) = αdx with 1 < α < ∞ and
dD(x) = αdx with 0 < α < 1. Let us consider each case separately.
(1) When dD(x) = ∞ we have to consider two snapshots, (dy, 1,∞ | dn, 0, dx)
and (dy, 0,∞ | dn, 1, dx)}. The first one is not an anonymous Nash because the
player located at r = 1 has an interest in moving to r = 2 improving the cost
from ∞ to 2d. The second one is not an anonymous Nash because d has interest
to abandon r = 1 and select (destroy) r = 2 increasing the delay from d to ∞.
(2) When dD(x) = 0 neither (dy, 1, 0 | dn, 0, dx) nor (dy, 0, 0 | dn, 1, dx) are
anonymous Nash. In the first one d has interest to select the second resource
because nobody is using it. In the second one, the user of the resource 2 has
interest to use resource 1.
(3) When dD(x) = αdx with 1 < α < ∞, the analysis of the snapshots
(dy, 1, αdx | dn, 0, dx) and (dy, 0, αdx | dn, 1, dx) is similar to the case dD(x) =∞.
(4) When dD(x) = αdx with 0 < α < 1 the analysis is similar to dD(x) = 0. uunionsq
6 On pure Nash equilibria
As a consequence of the preceding lemma we have the following theorem
Theorem 1. There are tuples 〈Unitn,k,d,A,D, fA, fD〉 such that for any w ∈
W, the profile Rw = 〈Unitn,k,d,A,D, fA, fD,w〉 describes a game Γ (Rw) with
no pure Nash equilibria.
However, when the game has an angel but no daemon d, there are anonymous
Nash equilibria (see below):
Example 11. Given Rw = 〈Unit1,2,d, {1, 2}, ∅, 1, 0,w〉 for any w ∈W. It is easy
to see that, (ay, 0, d
A(x) | an, 1, dx) is an anonymous pure Nash equilibrium
when dA(x) =∞ or dA(x) = αdx when 1 < α <∞ (this corresponds to a crash
moral). The following snapshot (ay, 1, d
A(x) | an, 0, dx) is an anonymous Nash
when dA(x) = 0 or dA(x) = αdx when 0 < α < 1 (under a benevolent moral) 2
When Unitn,k,d is under control of both a and d a variety of situations can arise
(as in the following example):
Example 12. Consider Rw = 〈Unit2,4,d, {1, 2}, {3, 4}, 1, 1,w〉 for any w having
extreme sensitivity. Under Crash there is no pure Nash. In this moral, no player
wishes to allocate work to resources selected by a or d (infinite delay). The
snapshot (ay, 0,∞ | an, 1, dx | dn, 1, dx | dy, 0,∞) is not an anonymous Nash
because d would select resource 3. Similarly (ay, 0,∞ | an, 0, dx | dn, 0, dx |
dy, 2,∞) is not an anonymous pure Nash. The snapshot (ay, 0,∞ | an, 2, dx |
dn, 0, dx | dy, 0,∞) is not stable because one player has an interest in moving to
resource 3. When the moral is benevolent (ay, 2, 0 | an, 0, dx | dn, 0, dx | dy, 0, 0)
is the only anonymous pure Nash equilibrium. When the moral is polarised the
anonymous Nash is (ay, 2, 0 | an, 0, dx | dn, 0, dx | dy, 0,∞). Finally, when the
moral is schizophrenic there is no Nash. In this case no player chooses a resource
selected by a (infinite delay). As the resource selected by d has delay 0 players
will move to this resource but d will subsequently select the other resource. 2
When there are enough resources to locate all the players on the angelic side,
sometimes there are Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2. If Rw = 〈Unitn,k,d,A,D, fA, fD,w〉 such that w has moral Crash
or Polarized, fA + n ≤ #A, then Γ (Rw) has always a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Given N = {1, . . . , n}, When there is enough place on the angelic side
and no player i ∈ N is tempted to use a resource in the demonic side the angel
and the players i ∈ N are in agreement.
We consider separately the morals Crash and Polarized. In the case of a Crash
moral, dAr = αd with 1 < α ≤ ∞ and dDr = βd with 1 < β ≤ ∞. Both,
a and d strictly increases de delay (degradates the performance) of fA and fD
servers respectivelly. Consider the possibilities offered to the broker in such a risk
profile. Whenever possible, the broker allocates jobs in undegradated servers. As
n ≤ #A − fA the angel has enough undegrated services to allocate the n jobs.
The broker spreads the n jobs in different servers and the social cost is dn. Let
us see that such an allocation is a PNE.
– As a job i is located in non-degradeted server, job i is not interested to move
into one of the fA + fD servers because delay increases.
– The angel a having selected fA servers has no interest no change the initial
choice. For instance if it degradates a site containing a job, the social cost
becomes (n− 1)d+ αd and therefore it increases in (α− 1)d > 0.
– Any change in d makes no change in the social cost.
Consider the case of a Polarized moral. In this case dAr = αd with 0 ≤ α < 1 and
dDr = βd with 1 < β ≤ ∞. The angel a improves fA servers and d degradates fD
servers. Initially the broker could locate the jobs into the untouched serves from
the angelic side, this give a social cost of dn. This allocation is far from to be
a PNE. For instance, a will select and improve min{n, fA} servers containing a
job and the social cost improves to αdmin{n, fA}+ (n−min{n, fA})d. In many
cases this situation is not yet a PNE. For instance, in the case of α being “really
small”, the jobs remaining in normal servers have interes to move to a server
improved by the angel. Suppopse that such one server contains x jobs with cost
αdx. A job in an a normal server has cost d. This job has interest to move into
an improved server if αd(x + 1) < d. This process will continue until a PNE is
reached.
uunionsq
7 Brokering
The use of risk profiles and Weltanschauungs may be extended from modelling
stressful grid environments to deriving resource allocation strategies for brokers.
Given an resource allocation problem C and an adequate risk profile R of a
web environment it is possible to determine if there is a pure Nash equilibrium
in Γ (R); if so the PNE (s, a, d) with optimal cost can be sent from the broker
to each player. Even in cases where there are no PNE the risk profiles for the
environment still provide an abstract description of web interactions which may
provide insights into which resources the broker should utilise.
Different brokers can have different criteria about the adequacy of risk profiles
and which parameters are critical. Depending on the brokers, different criteria
for optimality can be adopted. The following example illustrates how risk profiles
might be utilised by brokers.
Example 13. Consider the allocation problem given by a Unit3,4,d. With no in-
formation about network stress players should (eventually) choose any Nash
equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is obtained allocating different players in dif-
ferent resources. For instance s1 = 1, s2 = 2, s3 = 3 is a Nash.
Suppose that the allocation problem for Unit3,4,d is submitted to a broker.
The current stress situation about the resources is known by the broker and
is summarised in the risk profile R = 〈Unit3,4,d, {1, 2}, {3, 4}, 1, 1,w〉 with a
benevolent Weltanschauung w = (1/2, 1/2). In Γ (R) the snapshot
(ay, 1, dx/2 | an, 0, dx | dy, 1, dx/2 | dn, 1, dx)
is an anonymous Nash. The broker forwards to the four players any allocation
consistent with the anonymous Nash. For instance s1 = 1, s2 = 3 and s3 = 4
is a possible allocation and s1 = 3, s2 = 4, s3 = 1 is other possible suggestion.
Note that:
1. In a given allocation some players will have better outcomes than others; for
example, in the first allocation players 1 and 2 have delay d/2 but player 3
has delay d.
2. In different allocations players can have different delays. For example, player
3 has delays d and d/2 in the first and second allocations, respectively.
In this case the behaviour of the broker is clear: it should never propose the
allocation s1 = 1, s2 = 2, s3 = 3 since here is no snapshot consistent with this
allocation which corresponds to an anonymous Nash. If resources 1 and 2 are
selected, the angel a can improve one of them, say the first, giving the initial
snapshot (ay, 1, dx/2 | an, 1, dx | · · · , 1, · · · | . . . , 0, . . . ). d will elect to damage
the allocation by choosing resource 4 giving snapshot (ay, 1, dx/2 | an, 1, dx |
dn, 1, dx | dy, 0, dx/2) which does not correspond to an anonymous Nash (player
3 now has an incentive to allocate into resource 4). uunionsq
8 Discussion
Conventionally the behaviour of a web service is captured by treating the service
in isolation. For example, a service level agreement (SLA) might provide infor-
mation about the expected behaviour of a service. In this paper an alternative
view of web services is presented; here the behaviour of a set of services within
a stressed web environment is modelled by a strategic angel daemon game. Two
different abstractions for modelling stressed web environments are presented,
namely, risk profiles and Weltanschauungs. Risk profiles partition web services
into angel and daemon sets. Weltanschauungs consider the various scenarios that
can arise when angels and daemons have uniform abnormal delay functions at
a number of sensitivities. The use of risk profiles and Weltanschauungs raises a
number of questions about how the model should be interpreted in a concrete
situation:
1. How can a set of services be partitioned into angel and daemon controlled
sets?
2. How can a service’s performance improve under stress?
3. How can abnormal bounds for the angel and the daemon be set?
Perhaps one way to interpret the angel/daemon partition is by means of a cost
model: sets of low cost services are liable to be severely affected by stressed
environments – such sets of services may be considered to be under the control
of a daemon. On the other hand expensive services may be responsive even
when the surrounding environment becomes stressed. Note that some services
may be implemented on elastic clouds – as demand increases a service may
call upon more servers to facilitate ongoing requests. In this way it may be the
case that behaviour in abnormal stressed conditions may even be better than
under normal conditions. However, it seems likely that the choice of the abnormal
bound parameters would have to be made on the basis of experimental evidence.
The work reported in this paper provides insights into the dynamic behaviour
of sets of services embedded within a (stressed) web environment. Treating net-
work stress as a non-cooperative game clearly reflects the experience of web users
and brokers.
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